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MORALITY, RULES, AND CONSEQUENCES: A Critical Reader
Edited by Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason, and Dale E. Miller
EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS
MORALITY, RULES, AND CONSEQUENCES
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MORALITY, RULES, AND CONSEQUENCES
A Critical Reader
Edited by Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason, and Dale E. Miller
EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS
#
The Contributors, 2000
Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh
Typeset in Fournier by Hewer Text Ltd, Edinburgh, and printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 0 7486 1128 2 (hardback) ISBN 0 7486 1174 6 (paperback)
The right of the contributors to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Contents
Introduction
1
Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason, and Dale E. Miller
1
Between Act and Rule: The Consequentialism of G. E. Moore
6
William H. Shaw 2
The Educational Equivalence of Act and Rule Utilitarianism
27
Sanford S. Levy 3
Defending Rule Utilitarianism
40
Jonathan Riley 4
Values, Obligations, and Saving Lives
71
D. W. Haslett 5
The Moral Opacity of Utilitarianism
105
David Lyons 6
Global Consequentialism
7
Evaluative Focal Points
121
Philip Pettit and Michael Smith 134
Shelly Kagan 8
Hooker's Use and Abuse of Reflective Equilibrium
9
Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism
156
Dale E. Miller 179
Alan Thomas 10
Why Rule Consequentialism is not Superior to Ross-style Pluralism
Phillip Montague
203
Contents
vi
11
Ruling Out Rule Consequentialism
212
Tim Mulgan 12
Reflective Equilibrium and Rule Consequentialism
222
Brad Hooker 13
Rule Consequentialism and the Value of Friendship
239
Madison Powers Notes on Contributors
255
Index
257
Introduction Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason, and Dale E. Miller
What determines an action's moral standing, that is, whether it is right or wrong? While there is no comforting general consensus on an answer to this question, two ideas repeatedly bubble to the surface. The first is that a moral code ought to contain a number of rules that tell people how to behave and that are simple and few enough that
the
average
person
can
learn
and
obey
them.
The
second
is
that
the
consequences of actions matter, often more than anything else. It is clear that there is at least some tension between these ideas, since it seems unlikely that a relatively simple set of rules will always direct people to perform the actions which will result in the best state of affairs. Rule consequentialism draws on each of these ideas. Very roughly put, rule consequentialists believe that whether an action is morally wrong depends on whether
it
is
forbidden
by
the
authoritative
set
of
moral
rules,
and
that
the
authoritative set of rules is the set the universal establishment of which would have the best consequences. Obviously this rough statement of the view can be interpreted in different ways. Rule consequentialists differ, for example, about how literally the notion of universal establishment should be tak