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XVI Psychologists have, however, shown that what we are primarily aware of is not a succession of sense-data but figures-ground phenomena: Wittgenstein's ambiguous duck-rabbit is merely one such example. They have also drawn our attention to the existence of tertiary qualities in perception, such as 'symmetry' and 'elegance' which are just as directly given as are the perceived colours red, green or yellow. It is interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty has made considerable use of Gestalt ideas in his Phenomenology of Perception. One of the commonest reasons given by linguistic philosophers for not making direct use of the results of psychological research (although philosophers are usually willing to accept the first-hand results of physical science) is that philosophical accounts of perception and thinking are concerned with analysing the language in which these reports are made; that is to say, they are second-order enquiries. Often this approach is still more restricted and ordinary linguistic usage is taken as the yardstick against which questions relating to thought and perception are to be measured. The task of the philosopher is then con fined to the analysis of ordinary language. If he is more adventurous, as some writers on philosophical psychology are, he might go on to show how far the language used by psychological researchers falls short of the paradigms of common sense.
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Philosophic Foundations of Genetic Psychology and Gestalt Psychology A Comparative Study of the Empirical Basis, Theoretical Structure, and Epistemol08ical Groundwork of European Biol08ical Psychol08Y by ASH GOBAR MAR TINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE MARTINUS NljHOFF - PUBLISHER - THE HAGUE This treatise is intended for the students of Philosophy and Science primarily (and secondarily for the students of the Humanities) . The author's conception of the philosophy of science as the 'morphology of science' (rather than the popular 'grammar of science') involves the adoption of a double-perspective which is reflected in the two phases of this work: (I) The scientific assessment of the experimental phenomena of Biological Psychology (especially the genetic and gestalt psychologies) . (II) The logical analysis of the methodological and epistemological framework of Empirical Psychology (as a member of the family of the Biological Sciences) in general. Among the special features of this book the following may be noted: (1) A systematic review of the varieties of experimental studies in Biological Psychology supplemented with commentaries. (2) Dispelling the prevalent misconceptions and spurious criticisms of European Psychology (especially the genetic and gestalt trends) by returning to the original sources of evidence (c£ the General Bibliography). (3) Indicating, wherever possible, lines of rapprochement between the European and the American psychologies. (4) Original contributions, supplementary to the genetic and gestalt theories, notably in the morphological sketch of thought processes. (5) Outlining the prolegomenon to a realistic philosophy of science (especially biological sciences) in which the principle of methodological complementarity and the concept of phenomenological spectrum play special roles. "This field of enquiry, in which philosophers have as yet not shown much interest, is dealt with very ably and fully by Dr. Gobar," writes Dr. Wolfe Mays (cf. Introduction), Senior Lecturer in Philosophy of Science in the University of Manchester, "A very important part of this book contains Dr. Gobar's views on the philosophy of science in which he develops some interesting concepts. These connect his discussions of the empirical psychological data with philosophical MARTINUS NIJHOFF - PUBLISHER - THE HAGUE theorizing. We may spe