E-Book Overview
The complex issues of agency and self-agency have been examined by researchers in the related fields of psychology and neuropsychology. This volume approaches the cognitive and neuropsychological correlates as two sides of the same coin, with the aim of establishing a correspondence between the hardware (cerebral processes) and software (cognitive processes) of the representation of agency. All living systems self-regulate, and within any living system - whether it is as small as a cell or a complete plant or animal - there must be communication between its many parts. In addition, a prerequisite for organisms to act is an ability to distinguish between self and other. In humans, this ability may be either learned or comprise an inherent part of the process of action. The predominant account explaining the sense of agency of our own actions is the “central monitoring theory” or “comparator model” which postulates the monitoring of central and peripheral signals arising as a consequence of the execution of an action. Alternative perspectives include simulation theory. These models, as well as the contribution of body representation for agency, are explored here, taking into account the significance of proprioceptive feedback for self-agent attribution. Finally, the neural correlates of action and agent representation are discussed in the context of recent empirical results.
E-Book Content
Neuropsychology of the Sense of Agency
Michela Balconi (Ed.)
Neuropsychology of the Sense of Agency From Consciousness to Action
123
Editor Michela Balconi Department of Psychology Catholic University of Milan Milan, Italy
ISBN 978-88-470-1586-9
e-ISBN 978-88-470-1587-6
DOI 10.1007/978-88-470-1587-6 Springer Milan Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2010925396 © Springer Verlag Italia 2010 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Italian Copyright Law in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the Italian Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Product liability: The publishers cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information about dosage and application contained in this book. In every individual case the user must check such information by consulting the relevant literature. 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Cover design: Ikona S.r.l., Milan, Italy Typesetting: Graphostudio, Milan, Italy Printing and binding: Arti Grafiche Nidasio, Assago (MI), Italy Printed in Italy Springer-Verlag Italia S.r.l. – Via Decembrio 28 – I-20137 Milan Springer is a part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Preface
Not nothing without you but not the same Erich Fried (1979)
How do I know that I am the person who is moving? The neuroscience of action has identified specific cognitive processes that allow the organism to refer the cause or origin of an action to its agent. This sense of agency has been defined as the sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an action or a certain thought in my stream of consciousness. As such, one can distinguish actions that are self-generated from those generated by others, giving rise to the experience of a self-other distincti