Consciousness And Causality: A Debate On The Nature Of Mind (great Debates In Philosophy)

Consciousness and Causality A Debate on the Nature of Mind D. M. Annstrong and Nonnan Malcolm Basil Blackwell © D. M. Armstrong and Norman Malcolm 1984 First published 1984 Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF, England All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Armstrong, D. M. Consciousness and causality.-(Great debates in philosophy) 1. Mind and body 2. Intellect I. Title II. Malcolm, Norman III. Series 128'.2 BD162 ISBN 0-631-13212-0 ISBN 0-631-13433-6 Pbk Typeset at The Spartan Press Ltd, Lymington, Hants Printed in Great Britain by Pitman Press Ltd, Bath Contents Consciousness and Causality I NORMAN MALCOLM Consciousness 2 The subjective character of experience 3 The causal theory of mind 4 Conclusion 100 Consciousness and Causality 10 3 I 3 45 66 D. M. ARMSTRONG I Introductory 2 In defence of inner sense 3 In defence of the causal theory of mind 4 Qualities 105 108 137 169 Norman Malcolm's Reply 193 D. M. Armstrong's Reply 20 5 Index 21 9 Great Debates in Philosophy Since the time of Socrates, dialogue has been a powerful means of philosophical exploration and exposition. By presenting important current issues in philosophy in the form of a debate, this new series attempts to capture the flavour of philosophical argument and to convey the excitement generated by the interplay of ideas. There will normally be more than two sides to any argument, and for any two 'opponents' there will be points of agreement as well as points of disagreement. The debate will not, therefore, necessarily cover every aspect of the chosen topic, nor will it present artificially polarized arguments. The aim is to provide, in a thought-provoking format, a series of clear, accessible and concise introductions to a variety of subjects, ranging from formal logic to contemporary ethical issues. The series will be of interest to scholars, students and general readers alike, since each book brings together two outstanding philosophers to throw light on a topic of current controversy. The first essay states a particular position and the second essay counters it. The first author's rejoinder is again answered in the second author's reply. If the resulting book gives rise in its turn to further discussion, argument and debate among its readers it will have achieved its purpose. Consciousness and Causality NORMAN MALCOLM Acknowledgements I am grateful to the members of my seminars at King's College London, and at the University College of Swansea, in the academic year 1981-82, for their great help in our discussions of the topics of the present essay. I am especially indebted to Dan Rashid, ilham Dilman, Marina Barabas, and Dewi Phillips. I Consciousness There is a grammatical difference between two uses of the word 'conscious'. In one use this word requires an object: one is said to be conscious of something, or to be conscious that so-and-so. One can be said to be conscious