COMMAND FAILURE IN WAR COMMAND FAILURE IN WAR Psychology and Leadership Robert Pois and Philip Langer Indiana University Press bloomington and indianapolis This book is a publication of Indiana University Press 601 North Morton Street Bloomington, IN 47404-3797 USA http://iupress.indiana.edu Telephone orders 800-842-6796 Fax orders 812-855-7931 Orders by e-mail
[email protected] © 2004 by Robert Pois and Philip Langer All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American University Presses’ Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition. The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. Manufactured in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pois, Robert A. Command failure in war : psychology and leadership / Robert Pois and Philip Langer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-253-34378-X (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Command of troops—Case studies. 2. Military history, Modern—18th century. 3. Military history, Modern—19th century. 4. Military history, Modern—20th century. I. Langer, Philip. II. Title. UB210.P555 2004 355.3'3041—dc22 2003020259 1 2 3 4 5 09 08 07 06 05 04 To our families, and Patricia D. Murphy contents Preface ix Acknowledgments 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. xv Introduction 1 Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf, August 12, 1759 5 Napoleon in Russia, 1812 25 McClellan’s Flawed Campaign: The Wounded Ego 49 Lee at Gettysburg: The Failure of Success 73 Franklin, Tennessee: The Wrong Enemy 99 Beyond Conventional Historical Explanations: The British Military in World War I 122 Winston Churchill, Arthur Harris, and British Strategic Bombing 156 Stalingrad: A Ghastly Collaboration between Hitler and His Generals 173 Conclusion 215 Notes 231 Bibliography Index 277 267 preface The reader will observe that these essays provide a forum for exploring the contributions of a broad spectrum of psychological models to selected military events and individuals. We wish to emphasize, however, that none of these psychological perspectives was ever intended to represent a complete and exhaustive analysis of events and participants. Rather, our objective was to provide a sketch of critical factors, both psychological and historical, which we believed were signi¤cant contributors to failu