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Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988. — vi+131+v p.: ill.<strong>[Enhanced e-Version: scanned pages with OCR-layer]
<strong>Перевод названия: <em><strong>Решиться на то,<em> что было сделано: <em>генерал <strong>Уильям Юджин Депью и его редакция "<strong>Боевого Устава Сухопутных Войск [<em><strong>США]" <strong>1976 <em>года<strong>Краткая справка: FM 100-5, operations (Field Manual #100-5: Operation) - <strong>Боевой Устав Сухопутных Войск [<strong>Военных Сил США] <strong>№100-5. В версии 1976 года в Уставе была принята <em>новая иделогия, а именно, военная доктрина <strong>Воздушно-наземная операция (AirLand Battle Doctrine). Идеологом этих изменений был генерал армии США, <strong>Уильям Юджин Депью (William Eugene DePuy).<strong>Резюме: рассматривается историческая роль Уильяма Депью в деле создания военной доктрины "Воздушно-наземная операция".<strong>Foreword (Gerald T. Bartlett,<em> Lieutenant General, USA Commandant)Leavenworth Paper No. 16, <em>Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100—5, Operations, deals with the writing of doctrine and focuses on the efforts of General DePuy, the first TRADOC commander, to forge a coherent fighting doctrine for an increasingly complex Army in a time of turmoil. While Major Herbert praises DePuy's emphasis on doctrine and doctrinal change, he charges DePuy with creating a document that failed to engender confidence and thus had to be replaced. Nevertheless, DePuy's important manual revealed a new role for doctrine and sparked a doctrinal renaissance in the Army that led directly to today's widely accepted AirLand Battle doctrine.This study provides more than just a background to current doctrine. It demonstrates that a well-conceived doctrine is critical to the Army and the nation, describes why doctrine is so difficult to formulate, places doctrine at the center of peacetime professionalism, and admonishes the Army not to become complacent about the contents of its field manuals.Leavenworth Paper No. 16 illuminates the problems inherent in creating new doctrine and provides readers with a better understanding of our Army's vigilance concerning doctrine.Структура <strong>ISBN кода: 978 - ISBN префикс; 1 - маркер англоязычного региона; 4289 - индивидуальный номер издательства (<em>в данном случае военное ведомство маскируется под обобщённый ISBN код для мелких издательств); 1559 - номер издания; 6 - контрольная цифра.Индивидуальный номер серии "<em>Leavenworth Papers" (<strong>ISSN код): 0195-3451Дата выхода: июль 1988.
E-Book Content
Leavenworth Papers Num Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100—5, Operations by Major Paul H. Herbert FM 100-5 Department of the Army Field Manual Operations of Army Forces in the Field Headquarters, Department of the Army September 1968 FOREWORD Leavenworth Paper No. 16, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100—5, Operations, deals with the writing of doctrine and focuses on the efforts of General DePuy, the first TRADOC commander, to forge a coherent fighting doctrine for an increasingly complex Army in a time of turmoil. While Major Herbert praises DePuy's emphasis on doctrine and doctrinal change, he charges DePuy with creating a document that failed to engender confidence and thus had to be replaced. Nevertheless, DePuy's important manual revealed a new role for doctrine and sparked a doctrinal renaissance in the Army that led directly to today's widely accepted AirLand Battle doctrine. This study