The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections Author(s): Andreas Schedler Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 23, No. 1, Electoral Governance and Democratization. Gouvernance électorale et démocratisation (Jan., 2002), pp. 103-122 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601413 Accessed: 17/11/2008 20:55 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltd. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected] Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique. http://www.jstor.org InternationalPoliticalScienceReview(2002), Vol 23, No. 1, 103-122 The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections ANDREAS SCHEDLER In developing an analytical framework for the comparative ABSTRACT. study of processes of democratization by elections, this article first lays out the techniques of electoral manipulation authoritarian rulers employ to control electoral outcomes. It argues next that manipulated elections tend to trigger two-level games in which electoral competition is "nested" inside electoral reform, and outlines the causal interaction and strategic interdependence of the two levels. It describes