In this book, leading experts in international negotiations present formal models of conflict resolution and international negotiations. Besides the description of different models and approaches, the book answers three questions: How can the abstract concepts and results of rational choice theorists be made more understandable and plausible to political and social scientists not trained to work with formal models? What can be done to encourage practitioners to use not only simple but also mathematically advanced approaches in their analysis of real world negotiation problems? How can practitioners (e.g., politicians and diplomats) become interested in, take into account, and apply formal models of their more important problems?
Diplomacy Games
Rudolf Avenhaus · I. William Zartman (Editors)
Diplomacy Games Formal Models and International Negotiations
With 37 Figures and 42 Tables
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Professor Dr. Rudolf Avenhaus University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39 85577 Neubiberg Germany
[email protected] Professor I. William Zartman School of Advanced International Studies The John Hopkins University 1740 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D.C. 20036 USA
[email protected]
Library of Congress Control Number: 2007925685
ISBN 978-3-540-68303-2 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. Springer is a part of Springer Science+Business Media springer.com Published by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007 © International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 2007 The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Production: LE-TEX Jelonek, Schmidt & V¨ ockler GbR, Leipzig Cover-design: WMX Design GmbH, Heidelberg SPIN 11948902
42/3180YL - 5 4 3 2 1 0
Printed on acid-free paper
To Howard Raiffa The formal modeler of PIN
Preface
Why does all the research on international negotiations over the past 20 years make very little use of formal theory, despite statements like that of Peyton Young that the principal tool for analyzing negotiations is the theory of games? Formal analysis of negotiations centers on paradigmatic models like Nash’s bargaining scheme or Stahl and Rubinstein’s sequential models, yet case studies of important international negotiations use only the most elementary concepts. The state of the art was characterized some years ago by a controversy surrounding the role of formal models—notably rational choice models—in political science. Some political scientists claimed that formal models have contributed little to the progress of political theory as a whole. Others vigorously defended formal theory. Here we deal only with the international negotiations part of the dispute. From the very beginning and until toda