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This is a terrific book. The questions that Slapin asks about intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) in the European Union are extraordinarily important and ambitious, with implications for the EU and for international cooperation more generally. Furthermore, Slapin's theorizing of his core questions is rigorous, lucid, and accessible to scholarly readers without extensive formal modeling background . . . This book is a solid, serious contribution to the literature on EU studies.---Mark Pollack, Temple University "An excellent example of the growing literature that brings modern political science to bear on the politics of the European Union."---Michael Laver, New York University Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlikely. For example, small European states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiating European Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all EU members. Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto---or veto threat---has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration.
E-Book Content
Veto Power
Veto Power Institutional Design in the European Union Jonathan B. Slapin
The University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor
Copyright © by the University of Michigan 2011 All rights reserved This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publisher. Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America Ó Printed on acid-free paper 2014â•… 2013â•… 2012â•… 2011â•…â•… 4â•… 3â•… 2â•… 1 A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-0-472-11793-2 (cloth) ISBN 978-0-472-02775-0 (e-book)
To Aurelija and Benjamin
Contents
List of Tables
ix
List of Figures
x
Acknowledgments
xi
Introduction
1
1 Institutional Design at IGCs
8
2 Case Selection
20
3 Modeling Institutionalism and Intergovernmentalism
65
4 Testing Institutionalism and Intergovernmentalism
76
5 Winners and Losers at Amsterdam
89
6 Council Votes and Commissioners
99
7 Exit Threats, Veto Rights, and Integration
122
8 British Accession: Exit Options and Veto Power
139
Conclusion
147
Notes
157
References
167
Index
179
List of Tables
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9
Number of Missing Preferences by Actor . . . . . . . . . First Differences from Poisson Models . . . . . . . . . . Support for Change and Winning Percentage . . . . . . Marks and Steenbergen Issue Areas . . . . . . . . . . . Negotiating Positions on the Government Party Positions, Voters, and Ratification Pivots . . . . . . . . . . . Poisson Model to Explain Missing Preferences . . . . . . Treaty of Amsterdam Parliamenta