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Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner—along with the moral skepticism and ethical confusion that ensue—result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal character of moral obligation. After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to change the subject—falling back on nonmoral values or practical, first-person considerations—Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral obligations: their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as members of the moral community. As Darwall defines it, the concept of moral obligation has an irreducibly second-person aspect; it presupposes our authority to make claims and demands on one another. And so too do many other central notions, including those of rights, the dignity of and respect for persons, and the very concept of person itself. The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority—an account that Darwall carries from the realm of theory to the practical world of second-person attitudes, emotions, and actions. (20090301)
E-Book Content
The Second-Person Standpoint
Copyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College
Copyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College
The Second-Person Standpoint Morality, Respect, and Accountability
Stephen Darwall
Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England 2006
Copyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College
Copyright 䉷 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Darwall, Stephen L., 1946– The second-person standpoint : morality, respect, and accountability / Stephen Darwall. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-674-02274-4 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-674-02274-2 (alk. paper) 1. Ethics. 2. Authority. 3. Responsibility. 4. Respect for persons. I. Title. BJ1012.D333 2006 171'7—dc22 2006041229
Copyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College
For Julian and Will
Copyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College
Copyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College
Contents
Preface
ix
Part I 1 The Main Ideas I
3
2 The Main Ideas II
26
3 The Second-Person Stance and Second-Personal Reasons
39
Part II 4 Accountability and the Second Person
65
5 Moral Obligation and Accountability
91
6 Respect and the Second Person
119
Part III 7 The Psychology of the Second Person
151
8 Interlude: Reid versus Hume on Justice (with Contemporary Resonances)
181
Part IV 9 Morality and Autonomy in Kant 10 Dignity and the Second Person: Variations on Fichtean Themes
213 243
Copyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College
viii
Contents
11 Freedom and Practical Reason
277
12 A Foundation for Contractualism
300
Works Cited
323
Index
341
Copyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College
Preface
I have, I imagine, been thinking about the topic of this book for a long time without realizing it. Since the age of three, I have had an eye condition (called a “strabismus”) that makes it impossible for me to direct both of my eyes to the same object at the same time. This hasn’t affected my vision much. The most noticeable effect has been one that Hume refers to in the Treatise in con