Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation Between Critical Theory and Rational Choice James Johnson The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1. (Mar., 1993), pp. 74-86. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199303%2987%3A1%3C74%3AITRCPC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V The American Political Science Review is currently published by American Political Science Association. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/apsa.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact
[email protected] http://www.jstor.org Fri Apr 4 06:54:56 2008 American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 1 March 1993 IS TALK REALLY CHEAP? PROMPTING CONVERSATION BETWEEN CRITICAL THEORY AND RATIONAL CHOICE JAMES JOHNSON University of Rochester C ritical theory and rational choice theory share both overlapping concerns and parallel theoretical weaknesses. Specifically, both critical theorists and rational choice theorists are preoccupied with determining what rational can mean in the realm of social and political interaction. I show in a provisional way how game theory extends and deepens the critical theorists' basic intuition that unembellished strategic rationality cannot adequately sustain social and political interaction. And I suggest how critical theory identifies a mechanism underlying the force of the "cheap talk" that game theorists introduce in hopes of circumscribing the indeterminacy generated by their models. M y goal is to stimulate productive conversation between what are typically considered discordant research traditions. In fact, the first task of rational choice theory must be to circumscribe its own limits. -Elster, The Cement of Society Critical theory does not relate to established lines of research as a competitor, . . . it attempts to explain the specific limitations and relative rights of those approaches. -Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action One seeks a midwife for his thoughts, another someone whom he can help: origin of a good conversation. -Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil ritical theory and rational choice theory--exemplified by Jurgen Habermas' theory of communicative action and noncooperative game theory, respectively-converge in improbable but potentially productive ways at the intersection of the three epigraphs. This convergence is improbable because critical theorists and game theorists are at best indifferent to each others' work. It is potentially productive insofar as, by demonstrating mutual relevance and common concerns, it not only charts a tentative course beyond indifference but, in the process, extends the promise of enhanced theoret