E-Book Overview
The Afghanistan War achieved many firsts. It was the first trillion dollar war and Britain's longest war in a century. At its height it sucked in some fifty allied nations into a central Asian country of no strategic significance. It was undeniably a war, yet the civilians outnumbered the combined military manpower of all contributing nations, bar the United States. It began as a necessary response to the outrage of the September 11 attacks, but ended in a divisive and ruinous exercise in armed nation-building. More aid was thrown at Afghanistan than was distributed to the war-broken nations of Europe under the Marshall Plan, yet the country was left in a parlous state. Billions of dollars of Western ordnance was expended against an enemy equipped with AK-47s and little more. The phenomenal imbalance between the combatants did not result in clear victory but rather intractable stalemate. Nobody won. Ultimately, the Afghanistan War is difficult to ignore, or sweep under carpets. It is British government policy not to commission official war histories until a lengthy period has elapsed, typically a quarter of a century or longer. This policy clearly benefits protagonists whose reputations are thus preserved (at least while they are still alive), but it does little for those at the bottom of the pile, some of whom are now lying under gravestones. This book is written for those officers and soldiers. It addresses the broader strategic aspects of the war, both the military and civilian missions, but also seeks to tell the story from the perspective of the men and women who served in Task Force Helmand. With candour it seeks to answer the question: what exactly did happen in Britain's war in Afghanistan? Any proceeds from the book will be donated to the Army Benevolent Fund
E-Book Content
OPERATION HERRICK An unofficial history of British military operations in Afghanistan 2001-2014 By ‘Sallust’ Copyright © ‘Sallust’ 2015 This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent publisher. The moral right of ‘Sallust’ has been asserted. ISBN-13: 978-1519225511 ISBN-10: 1519225512 Dedicated to wonderful nieces Teresa, Sophia, and Isabel. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Afghanistan War generated an impressive corpus of books and studies. By the second half of the war, the Afghanistan Conflict Analyst Bibliography had already extended to some 250 pages. It would be impractical to acknowledge all the authors that have helped shape this author’s understanding of what was plainly an obdurately complex conflict. It is hoped the footnotes illustrate that they were many. Special mention should be made of some of the outstanding authors in the field. The output of Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Relations, was prodigious. Over the course of the war he generated close to one hundred reports, dense with trenchant, honest criticism. Antonio Giustozzi has good claim to be the Afghan expert. His books and studies provided indispensable understanding of Afghan society and recent history. Michael Martin’s intimate study of the war from the perspective of Helmandis was frankly outstanding. James Fergusson wrote the first of the reflective works on the war. Frank Ledwidge, a Naval Reservist, wrote the key work challenging British counter-insurgency practice. Emile Simpson, a Gurkha officer, published a brilliant academic study on the nature of modern counter-insurgencies. Retired Generals Christopher Elliott and Andrew MacKay wrote intelligent works t