Reasons Of Which Reason Knows Not

CHURCH / REASONS OF WHICH REASON KNOWS NOT ■ 31 Reasons of Which Reason Knows Not Jennifer Church ABSTRACT: How is it possible for unconscious states to function as reasons? Two challenges are considered— one concerning the apparent dependence of normativity on self-knowledge, the other concerning the apparent irrationality of the unconscious. Both challenges are addressed through a discussion of ‘spatial reasoning’, which helps to make sense of ‘emotional reasoning’ as well. response based on the nature of action in space. Although I focus, for the most part, on unconscious reasons, in the end it should be clear how the proposed line of response helps to make sense of emotional reasons as well. KEYWORDS: reasons, unconscious, normativity, irrationality, emotions Pascal’s quote may be interpreted in (at least) two different ways, depending on whether we assume that the “reasons of which reason knows not” are not accessed by consciousness or that, even when accessed, they are not recognized as reasons. The difference can be illustrated with an example: I find myself afraid of someone that I meet at a friend’s house; I don’t know why I am afraid of this person; he has not said or done anything threatening, and he is evidently a good friend of my friend; and yet I suspect that there is a reason for my fear. On the one hand, it is possible that this person actually has done something threatening—a menacing look in my direction, or a secret smile of pleasure at another’s discomfort, for example—and I have noted this behavior unconsciously. If I were to become conscious of this behavior, I would recognize it as a reason for my fear and could give it its due. On the other hand, it is possible that this person merely looks like someone else from my past— someone who did endanger me—and I have extended my fear from one to the other. If I were to become conscious of this extension, I would recognize it as unreasonable and I would try not to “The heart has its reasons of which reason knows not” —Pascal1 T about the idea that we can be ignorant of our own reasons. Whereas Pascal attributed certain reasons to the heart versus the mind, we may attribute such reasons to the emotional versus the cognitive mind or to the unconscious versus the conscious mind, but the central conviction remains the same: we may be moved by reasons without ever consciously thinking of them as reasons. How is it possible, though, to respond to something as a reason without consciously thinking it through? In what follows, I elaborate on why we should be puzzled by the possibility that our reasons are unknown to us, explaining why some simple solutions are inadequate, and developing a more promising line of HERE IS SOMETHING DEEPLY PUZZLING © 2005 by The Johns Hopkins University Press Two Possibilities 32 ■ PPP / VOL. 12, NO. 1 / MARCH 20