E-Book Overview
This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution the authors devote a separate chapter wherein they study its properties in full detail. Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. The authors also investigate in separate chapters continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. The study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set). Such axiomatizations have not appeared in any book. Moreover, the book contains a detailed analysis of the main results on cooperative games without side payments. Such analysis is very limited or non-existent in other books on game theory.
E-Book Content
THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY General Editors: W. Leinfellner (Vienna) and G. Eberlein (Munich) Series A: Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences Series B: Mathematical and Statistical Methods Series C: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research Series D: System Theory, Knowledge Engineering and Problem Solving SERIES C: GAME THEORY, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH VOLUME 34 Editor-in-Chief : H. Peters (Maastricht University, The Netherlands); Honorary Editor: S. H. Tijs (Tilburg University, The Netherlands). Editorial Board: E.E.C. van Damme (Tilburg University, The Netherlands); H. Keiding (University of Copenhagen, Denmark); J.-F. Mertens (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium); H. Moulin (Rice University, Houston, USA); Shigeo Muto (Tokyo University, Japan); T. Parthasarathy (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India); B. Peleg (Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel); T.E.S. Raghavan (University of Illinois