E-Book Overview
This book explores how the political process in the United States influences the economy and how economic conditions influence electoral results. It explains how the interaction between the President and Congress lead to the formulation of macroeconomic policy and how the American voters achieve moderation by balancing the two institutions. Fluctuations in economic growth are shown to depend on the results of elections and, conversely, electoral results to depend on the state of the economy. The final chapter of the book establishes striking similarities between the American political economy and other industrial democracies.
E-Book Content
This book develops an integrated approach to understanding the American economy and national elections. Economic policy is generally seen as the result of a compromise between the president and Congress. Because Democrats and Republicans usually maintain polarized preferences on policy, middle-of-the-road voters seek to balance the president by reinforcing in Congress the party not holding the White House. This balancing leads, always, to relatively moderate policies and, frequently, to divided government. The authors first outline the rational partisan business cycle, where Republican administrations begin with recessions, and Democratic administrations with expansions, and next the midterm cycle, where the president's party loses votes in the midterm congressional election. The book argues that both cycles are the result of uncertainty about the outcome of presidential elections. Other topics covered include retrospective voting on the economy, coattails, and incumbency advantage. A final chapter shows how the analysis sheds light on the economies and political processes of other industrial democracies. PARTISAN POLITICS, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT, AND THE ECONOMY THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS Editors James E. Alt, Harvard University Douglass C. North, Washington University in St. Louis Other books in the series James E. Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development Gary W. Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England Jean Ensminger, Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an African Society Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict Leif Lewin, Ideology and Strategy: A Century of Swedish Politics (English edition) Gary Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights Matthew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress: Structure and Policy Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, The Fruits of Revolution: Property Rights, Litigation, and French Agriculture Charles Stewart III, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, 1865-1921 John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey PARTISAN POLITICS, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT, AND THE ECONOMY ALBERTO ALESINA and HOWARD ROSENTHAL Harvard University Princeton University CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB21RP 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia © Cambridge University Press 1995 First published 1995 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Alesina, Alberto. Partisan politics/Alberto Alesina, Howard Rosenthal.