Theories Of Ethics (oxford Readings In Philosophy)

THEORIES OF ETHICS Edited by PHILIPPA FOOT OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS This book has been printed digitally and produced in a standard specification in order to ensure its continuing availability OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Sao Paulo Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York Introduction and Selection © Oxford University Press 1967 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) Reprinted 2002 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under tenns agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer ISBN 0-19-875005-6 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION MOORE'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST CERTAIN FORMS OF I. NATURALISM 16 by C. L. Stevenson A REPLY TO My CRITICS II. 33 by G. E. Moore I I I . THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY 50 by W. K. Frankena GOOD AND EVIL IV. 64 by P. T. Geach GEACH: GOOD AND EVIL V. 74 by R. M. Hare MORAL BELIEFS VI. 83 by Philippa Foot VII. H o w TO DERIVE 'OUGHT' FROM 'Is' 101 by John R. Searle VIII. THE PROMISING GAME 1 15 by R. M . Hare THE INTERPRETATION OF THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF IX. J. S. MILL 128 by J. O . Urmson INTERPRETATIONS OF MILL'S 'UTILITARIANISM' X. by J. D. Mabbott 13 7 XI. Two CONCEPTS OF RULES by J oho Rawls 144 X I I . EXTREME AND RESTRICTED UTILITARIANISM 17 1 by J. J. C. Smart NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS 184 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 85 INDEX OF NAMES 188 Most of these articles are reprinted without revision, or with only small alterations. They are not, of course, to be taken as neces­ sarily reflecting their authors' present opinions. INTRODUCTION THE ARTICLES reprinted here centre round two topics lately much debated : firstly the nature of moral judgement, and secondly the part played by social utility in determining right and wrong. Both these debates go back to the eighteenth century, for at that time philo­ sophers divided for and against the moral sense and intellectualist theories of moral judgement, and at the end of the century Bentham laid down that the principle of utility was the foundation of moral good. The later articles in the volume (numbers IX-XII) are quite simply about utilitarianism, so their relation to the past is clear. Numbers I-VII I are less obviously related to the subject of eighteenth-century battles ; but nevertheless the connexion is close. Like ourselves Hume and his contemporaries were concerned with the possible, or impossible, objectivity of moral judgements. In what,