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In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not be only one universal truth. Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together.
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Wong, David B. Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Duke University Natural Moralities A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism Publication date 2006 (this edition) Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-530539-5 doi:10.1093/0195305396.001.0001 Abstract: To be called a relativist, especially a moral relativist, is to be condemned as someone who holds that ―anything goes‖. Frequently the term is part of a dichotomy: either accept relativism or accept universalism: the view that only one true morality exists. This book defends a new version of relativism that is both an alternative to, and fits between, universalism and relativism as usually defined. Pluralistic relativism does accord with one aspect of relativism as usually defined: there is no single true morality. Beyond that, it is argued that there can be a plurality of true moralities, moralities that exist across different traditions and cultures, all of which address facets of the same problem: how we are to live well together. A comparative and naturalistic approach is applied to the understanding of moralities, with discussion of a wide array of positions and texts within the Western canon as well as in Chinese philosophy, and drawing on not only philosophy, but also psychology, evolutionary theory, history, and literature in making a case for the importance of pluralism in moral life and in establishing the virtues of acceptance and accommodation. A central theme is that there is no single value or principle or ordering of values and principles that offers a uniquely true path for human living, but variations according to different contexts that carry within them a common core of human values. We should thus be modest about our own morality, learn from other approaches, and accommodate different practices in our pluralistic society. I. How Pluralism and Naturalism Make for Natural Moralities 1. Pluralism and Ambivalence The case for pluralistic relativism begins with discussing a discomforting kind of moral disagreement that gives rise to moral ambivalence: this is not simply disagreement in which both sides run out of reasons that are persuasive to the other, but is also a disagreement in which coming to understand the other side brings along an appreciation of its reasons. The root of moral ambivalence is the existence of plural and irreducible moral values (e.g., special duties to particular people and groups, rights, utility, perfectionist ends or values, commitment to one‘s own projects and undertakings, and attunement to the world) and our coming to understand how others could have made choices different from the ones we make in the face of conflicts among these values. Moral ambivalence poses difficulties for universalism. A case in point is ambivalence in the face of conflict between personal values (special duties, commitment to one‘s own projects) and impersonal values (rights possessed by everyone, utility). 2. Pluralistic Relativism It is argued that moral ambivalence is best explained through a naturalistic approach that construes morality as a social invention for promoting and regulating social cooperation. Morality accomplishes this function through the shaping not only of behavior but also of motivational structures in human beings. Biological and cultural evolutionary theories identify plausible bases for the emergence of such an invention (e.g., the strength of self-
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