The present book comprises a collection of papers dealing with the reassessment of thinking in Cognitive Science and in Philosophy today.
Still dependent on basic assumptions of Cartesian philosophy, Cognitive Science took over the mistakes of classical computational models. Instead of being treated as mere or pure explanations of mental processes with hindsight, these models were mistakenly used as more or less literal causal descriptions of the (working of the) mind. A clear insight into the relevance of embodied and embedded knowledge is not only a central topic in AI research; it can become a driving force for a reassessment of philosophy. Philosophy, which is struggling with the two opposite alternatives of cultural relativism and rationalism, both of which have turned out to be dead ends, is in need of a reassessment of reasoning. What is needed is a reasoning without reference to ultimate reasons which at the same time is grounded (and doesn’t fall into the trap of cultural relativism).
After Cognitivism
Karl Leidlmair Editor
After Cognitivism A Reassessment of Cognitive Science and Philosophy
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Editor Dr. Karl Leidlmair Head of Department Department of Psychology University of Innsbruck Innrain 52 6020 Innsbruck Austria
[email protected]
ISBN 978-1-4020-9991-5 e-ISBN 978-1-4020-9992-2 DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-9992-2 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2009926815 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
For Barbara Becker. She was a wonderful person
Preface
There is a basic perplexity in our times. On the one hand, we find a blind trust in technology and rationalism. In our neo-liberalistically dominated world only what can be rapidly exploited and commercialized seems to count. The only opposing reaction to this kind of rationalism is an extreme rejection of all kinds of reasoning, and sometimes attendant religious fundamentalism. But instead of reflecting on the limits and possibilites of reasoning, dialogue is replaced by a demagogic struggle between cultures. One cause of the blind trust in technology is misunderstandings about the significance and the application of theories in the reception of the so-called Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is essentially characterized by two forces: (i) the conception of society as a social contract and (ii) the new science (Newtonian physics, etc.). But as a result we lost ground: Atomistic individualism nourished the illusion of a self-contained ego prior to man’s entering into a shared inter-subjective world. And in the new science, our constructions of reality became autonomous and independent of our interventions. Thus we became caught in the inherent dynamism of our computational constructions of reality. Science, as it is applied today, operates with far too simple parameters and model-theoretic constructions – erroneously taking the latter (the models) as literal descriptions of reality. It seems as if mankind has to adapt to its own technological fabrications instead of developing them according to its own needs and desires. Contents are defined by software and not, as it ought to be, softw