Philosophy of Science: From Justification to Explanation Aharon Kantorovich The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Dec., 1988),469-494. Stable URL:
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Brit. 1. Phil. Sci. 39 (1988). 469-494
Printed in Great Britain
Philosophy of Science: From Justification to Explanation AHARON KANTOROVICH*
ABSTRACT
The paper investigates the implications of a nonaprioristic philosophy of science. It starts by developing a scheme of justification which draws its norms from the prevailing paradigm of rationality, which need not be universal or eternal. If the requirement for normativity is then abandoned we do not end up with a descriptive philosophy of science. The alternative to a prescriptive philosophy of science is a theoretical explanation of scientific decisions and acts. Explanation, rather than mere description, replaces justification: and the paradigm of rationality becomes a scientific paradigm. The implications of these results for the discovery-justification distinction are investigated. An explanatory philosophy of science deals with the generation, as well as with the selection of scientific conjectures: both contexts have an epistemic dimension.
Introduction 1 Justification vs. Explanation 1.1 Justification and Paradigms oJ Rationality 1.2 From Description to Explanation 2 The Discovery-Justijication Distinction 2.1 The Traditional D-J Distinction 2.2 Objections to the D-J Distinction and the Epistemic Dimension oJ Discovery INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the philosophy of science has undergone radical changes. With the decline of logical empiricism, it is not believed as widely as before that the source of scientific rationality can only be found in some system of formal logic or methodology. The philosophy of science, however, has not yet settled on a new, widely accepted path. Thus, fundamental questions are raised with respect to its scope, tasks, and methods. For example, what should supplement or replace the logical analysis of science? Should the philosophy of science be closely linked to the history of science or should it perhaps be converted into a * This paper was written under the auspices of the Wolfson Chair Extraordinary of Theoretical Physics, Tel Aviv University.
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science of science? There are however two prior, more fundamental, questions which have engaged traditional philosophers of science, and which are now posed more forcefully. The first question is whether the philosophy of science should adopt the task of appraising scientific claims; should it be content with the more modest aim of describing science, its methods and