Kant’s Theoretical Conception Of God

KANT’S THEORETICAL CONCEPTION OF GOD Yaron Noam Hoffer Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, September 2017 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Doctoral Committee _________________________________________ Allen W. Wood, Ph.D. (Chair) _________________________________________ Sandra L. Shapshay, Ph.D. _________________________________________ Timothy O'Connor, Ph.D. _________________________________________ Michel Chaouli, Ph.D 15 September, 2017 ii Copyright © 2017 Yaron Noam Hoffer iii To Mor, who let me make her ends mine and made my ends hers iv Acknowledgments God has never been an important part of my life, growing up in a secular environment. Ironically, only through Kant, the ‘all-destroyer’ of rational theology and champion of enlightenment, I developed an interest in God. I was drawn to Kant’s philosophy since the beginning of my undergraduate studies, thinking that he got something right in many topics, or at least introduced fruitful ways of dealing with them. Early in my Graduate studies I was struck by Kant’s moral argument justifying belief in God’s existence. While I can’t say I was convinced, it somehow resonated with my cautious but inextricable optimism. My appreciation for this argument led me to have a closer look at Kant’s discussion of rational theology and especially his pre-critical writings. From there it was a short step to rediscover early modern metaphysics in general and embark upon the current project. This journey could not have been completed without the intellectual, emotional, and material support I was very fortunate to receive from my teachers, colleagues, friends, and family. Long before I imagined Allen Wood would be my advisor, I was fascinated by his books ‘Kant’s Moral Religion’ and ‘Kant’s Rational Theology’, which provided the spark for this project. As an advisor Allen exceeded my already high expectations. In addition to his generosity in sharing his vast knowledge in the history of philosophy, his constant availability to discuss all aspects of my work and his prompt and insightful comments, Allen has the special talent of managing dissertation projects towards completion: knowing when to push and when to allow freedom, what to cut and what to expand. For this and more I will always be grateful. I would like to thank the dissertation committee: Sandra Shapshay, Timothy O’Connor and Michel Chaouli. Sandra was tremendously helpful throughout the process. I am grateful for her v courses on Kant’s aesthetics, her thorough feedback on the various papers on which the dissertation is based, and the general encouraging advice about academic life. My first class at IU was Tim’s seminar which interrupted my linguistic slumber and introduced me to the wonders of metaphysics. Our following conversations enriched in many ways my approach to early modern metaphysics and contributed significantly to this project. With Michel I took an individual readings course devoted to the Critique of the Power of Judgment in which we explored the fascinating broader implications of this work. I also thank him for welcoming me into the department of Germanic Studies and The Center for Theoretical Inquiry in the Humanities which were a second home for me at IU. I owe much also to other members of the IU Philosophy Department. I thank Gary Ebbs and Kirk Ludwig for their rigorous and demanding classes and for their support as chair and DGS. I thank Fred Schmitt and Marcia Baron for the valua