Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior generally asserts that brain mechanisms ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain consists entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Contemporary basic physical theory differs from classic physics on the important matter of how consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone account for the structure of all empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience. Brain, Mind and Consciousness: Advances in Neuroscience Research explores this new framework.
Brain, Mind and Consciousness
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Petr Bob
Brain, Mind and Consciousness Advances in Neuroscience Research
Petr Bob Center for Neuropsychiatric Research of Traumatic Stress and Department of Psychiatry Charles University Prague, Czech Republic
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ISBN 978-1-4614-0435-4 e-ISBN 978-1-4614-0436-1 DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-0436-1 Springer New York Dordrecht Heidelberg London Library of Congress Control Number: 2011936223 © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written permission of the publisher (Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 233 Spring Street, New York, NY 10013, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden. The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks, and similar terms, even if they are not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Preface
More than three centuries ago, Rene Descartes looked for “the seat of the soul” within the brain that could integrate res cogitans, representing the inner world, with res extensa – the outside world. Descartes thought that this special place is involved in sensation, imagination, memory, and the causation of bodily movements, and described the mind as an extracorporeal entity. In this theoretical concept Descartes intuitively anticipated the so-called binding problem of consciousness, which means that there is a part of the nervous system that integrates and transforms neural activity into reportable subjective experiences in the hypothetical center later called the Cartesian theater. In agreement with this Cartesian concept there is evidence that certain parts of the brain are more essential for consciousness than others and may represent local integrative centers. On the other hand, there is a conceptual approach to consciousness that suggests that consciousness (instead of a single central place – “Cartesian theater”) might be related to the binding of various events represented by groups of synchronized excited neurons that are located at different parts of the brain without unifying spatial convergence. This neural activity occurs synchronously across brain regions and likely underlies the integrat