Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes (typically) in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or agent-independent phenomenon.
Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science
LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE VOLUME 21
Editors Shahid Rahman, University of Lille III, France John Symons, University of Texas at El Paso, U.S.A.
Editorial Board Jean Paul van Bendegem, Free University of Brussels, Belgium Johan van Benthem, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands Jacques Dubucs, University of Paris I-Sorbonne, France Anne Fagot-Largeault Collège de France, France Bas van Fraassen, Princeton University, U.S.A. Dov Gabbay, King’s College London, U.K. Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University, U.S.A. Karel Lambert, University of California, Irvine, U.S.A. Graham Priest, University of Melbourne, Australia Gabriel Sandu, University of Helsinki, Finland Heinrich Wansing, Technical University Dresden, Germany Timothy Williamson, Oxford University, U.K.
Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science aims to reconsider the question of the unity of science in light of recent developments in logic. At present, no single logical, semantical or methodological framework dominates the philosophy of science. However, the editors of this series believe that formal techniques like, for example, independence friendly logic, dialogical logics, multimodal logics, game theoretic semantics and linear logics, have the potential to cast new light on basic issues in the discussion of the unity of science. This series provides a venue where philosophers and logicians can apply specific technical insights to fundamental philosophical problems. While the series is open to a wide variety of perspectives, including the study and analysis of argumentation and the critical discussion of the relationship between logic and the philosophy of science, the aim is to provide an integrated picture of the scientific enterprise in all its diversity.
For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/6936
Erik J. Olsson · Sebastian Enqvist Editors
Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science
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Editors Prof. Erik J. Olsson University of Lund Dept. Philosophy Kungshuset 222 22 Lund Sweden
[email protected]
Sebastian Enqvist University of Lund Dept. Philosophy Kungshuset 222 22 Lund Sweden
[email protected]
ISBN 978-90-481-9608-1 e-ISBN 978-90-481-9609-8 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2010938250 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a