E-Book Overview
This book explores the politics of wildlife conservation policy in Africa, specifically Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. The book addresses a general question: Why don't wildlife policies seem to be working? Rather than use standard explanations such as "bureaucratic inefficiency" or "corrupt dictators," the book demonstrates how politicians at all levels use wildlife policy for their own political ends, which may or may not include conservation. The book uses electoral and archival data, as well as interviews with individuals ranging from presidents to poachers to address this issue.
E-Book Content
POLITICIANS AND POACHERS THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WILDLIFE POLICY IN AFRICA Although wildlife fascinates citizens of industrialized countries, little is known about the politics of wildlife policy in Africa. In this innovative book, Clark Gibson challenges the rhetoric of television documentaries and conservation organizations to explore the politics behind the creation and change of wildlife policy in Africa. This book examines what Gibson views as a central puzzle in the debate: Why do African governments create policies that apparently fail to protect wildlife? Moving beyond explanations of bureaucratic inefficiency and corrupt dictatorships, Gibson argues that biologically disastrous policies are retained because they meet the distributive goals of politicians and bureaucrats. Using evidence from Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, Gibson shows how institutions encourage politicians and bureaucrats to construct wildlife policies that further their own interests. Different configurations of electoral laws, legislatures, party structures, interest groups, and traditional authorities in each country shape the choices of policymakers - many of which are not consonant with conservation. This book will appeal to students of institutions, comparative politics, natural resource policy making, African politics, and wildlife conservation. Clark C. Gibson is an assistant professor of political science and research associate at the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change at Indiana University. Drawing onfieldworkin more than a dozen countries, he focuses primarily on the politics of development in nonindustrialized countries.
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS Series Editors
Randall Calvert, University of Rochester, New York Thrainn Eggertsson, Max Planck Institute, Germany, and University of Iceland Founding Editors James E. Alt, Harvard University Douglass C. North, Washington University of St. Louis Other books in the series Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy Lee J. Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson and Douglass C. North, eds., Empirical Studies in Institutional Change Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie, Southern Paternalism and the Rise of the American Welfare State: Economics, Politics, and Institutions, 1865-1965 James E. Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek, eds., Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, 2nd edition Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, eds., Structure and Policy in japan and the United States Gary W. Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral System Jean Ensminger, Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an African Society Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, The Transformation of Property Rights in the Gold Coast: An Empirical Analysis Applying Rational Choice Theory Clark C. Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in