The Nature And Value Of Knowledge: Three Investigations

E-Book Overview

This volume comprises three distinct investigations into the relationship between the nature and the value of knowledge. Each is written by one of the authors in consultation with the other two. 'Knowledge and Understanding' (by Duncan Pritchard) critically examines virtue-theoretic responses to the problem of the value of knowledge, and argues that the finally valuable cognitive state is not knowledge but understanding. 'Knowledge and Recognition' (by Alan Millar) develops an account of knowledge in which the idea of a recognitional ability plays a prominent role, and argues that this account enables us better to understand knowledge and its value. 'Knowledge and Action' (by Adrian Haddock) argues for an account of knowledge and justification which explains why knowledge is valuable, and enables us to make sense of the knowledge we have of our intentional actions.

E-Book Content

The Nature and Value of Knowledge This page intentionally left blank The Nature and Value of Knowledge Three Investigations Duncan Pritchard Alan Millar Adrian Haddock 1 1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford   Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York  Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock 2010 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Library of Congress Control Number: 2010920357 Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by MPG Books Group, Bodmin and King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–958626–4 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Preface This book is an outcome of a project on the value of knowledge in which each of us was a participant. The aim of the project was to investigate whether light could be shed on the nature of knowledge by reflecting on whether, and if so why, knowledge is of value to us. The core issue about value was, of course, not whether knowledge is better than ignorance, but whether knowledge is better than true belief, or states implicating true belief but falling short of knowledge. The topic is opportune for at least two reasons. The first connects with the fact that there are widely differing views on the nature of knowledge, and on how to pursue the theory of knowledge. The epistemological mainstream aspires to a reductive account of knowledge in terms of true belief plus the satisfaction of further conditions. But a growing number of philosophers, most notably Timothy Williamson, challenge this asp